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Introduction
Patients may be in difficult situations, and frequently it is hard to 
decide what ought to be done. For instance, a  patient could suffer 
from serious cancer and be in deep crisis. In this situation it is dif-
ficult to choose among  possible options of  standard treatment, 
experimental treatment [1], complementary treatment, and maybe
withstanding  treatment. It is hard for the patient and for the phy-
sician to find out what is in the best interest of  the patient. The 
American ethicists Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress 
have developed a framework of  four ethical principles which may 
be a good starting point in such situations. These four principles 
are respect for autonomy (respecting the decisionmaking capaci-
ties of  autonomous persons), nonmaleficence (avoiding the cau-
sation of  harm), beneficence (providing benefits and balancing 
benefits, burdens, and risks), and justice (fairness in the distribu-
tion of  benefits and risks) [1,2]. These principles form a moral 
framework which the patient and the physician can use to analyze 
the situation. The principles are prima facie binding meaning that 
they must be fulfilled in every situation if  they do not conflict 
with other principles.If  the principles conflict they ought to be 
specified and balanced [1].
According to Beauchamp and Childress, these four principles are 
not specific for biomedical ethics; they form the core part of  a 
universal common morality. These ethicists think that morally se-
rious persons do share some moral rules, principles, rights, and 
virtues in common. For instance, they know not to kill, to tell 
the truth, to nurture the young and dependent, and not to steal. 
These common norms are not implemented the same way in all 
cultures; however, the norms themselves are cross cultural. There 
is a transparent correlation between moral rules and principles of  
the common morality. For instance, the rule of  do not kill is justi-
fied by the principle of  nonmaleficence, the rule of  tell the truth 
is justified by the principle of  respect for autonomy, the rule of  
nurture the young and dependent is justified by the principle of  
beneficence, and the rule of  do not steal is justified by the prin-
ciple of  justice. The common morality has normative force, i.e. 
it sets moral standards for everyone and all human conduct can 
be judged by its standards. This means that if  persons violate the 
norms of  the common morality they are unethical [1]. Beauchamp 
and Childress appeal to the common morality nonnormatively by 
claiming that we can study empirically whether the norms of  the 
common morality are actually present in all cultures [1].
There is debate on whether Beauchamp and Childress’ moral 
framework is cross cultural. Critics stress that it is limited to 
America and they have an idea of  a specific European ethics in 
contrast to the American ethics of  Beauchamp and Childress 
[3,4]. For instance, as an alternative to Beauchamp and Childress’ 
account, the Danish ethicists Jacob Rendtorff  and Peter Kemp 
believe that the moral concepts of  autonomy, dignity, integrity, 
and vulnerability are useful for managing ethical difficult cases in 
Europe [4]. The Danish philosopher and physician Soeren Holm 
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states that the positive obligations of  beneficence and justice are 
underdeveloped in Beauchamp and Childress’ theory, these ob-
ligations need to be stronger for the theory to be functional in 
Europe [3]. The theory of  Beauchamp and Childress has influ-
ence all over the world, where it is both taught to and used by 
students, nurses, physicians etc. Therefore it is important to inves-
tigate whether this theory is useful without modifications in other 
contexts than the American.
The aim of  this article is specifically to examinehow to investigate 
whether there are indications thatthe principles of  Beauchamp 
and Childress are cross cultural; i.e. whether they can be used out-
side America, for instance in Europe and Asia.Therefore, this ar-
ticle is focused on the theory of  Beauchamp and Childress and we 
will not gointo general discussions of  neither moral universalism 
versus particularism nor empirical ethics versus normative ethics.
In this article, first, the theory of  Beauchamp and Childress is 
introduced. Second, a suitable method for studying the common 
morality of  Beauchamp and Childress empirically is outlined. This 
method was used for a Danish empirical study of  the theory of  
Beauchamp and Childress where Danish oncologists and Danish 
molecular biologists were interviewed. This study is reviewed in 
the article, and lastly, future perspectives for cross cultural empiri-
cal studiesof  the theory are outlined.
Normative Justification of  the Common Morality
Beauchamp thinks that people in all cultures grow up with knowl-
edge of  some basic moral rules and an understanding of  which 
demands that these rules make upon everyone. This body of  basic 
moral rules constitutes morality in all cultures and Beauchamp 
calls this shared universal system of  precepts the common moral-
ity or morality in the narrow sense. From this point of  view, there 
is no difference in basic rules of  morality in America, Denmark, 
Italy, China, and Japan. The common morality has normative 
force; hence it sets moral standards for everyone and if  people 
do not live up to these standards they are immoral. Hence, all 
human behavior can rightly be judged by the demands of  the 
common morality. According to Beauchamp, the rules of  the 
common morality are a product of  human conduct, experience, 
and history, meaning that they are learned in society [1,5,6]. He 
believes that human nature is similar enough that we will make 
similar judgments when we experience limited resources, need to 
cooperate  etc. (personal communication with Beauchamp).   The 
aims of  the common morality are to promote human flourishing 
by thwarting circumstances causing the quality of  people’s lives 
to get worse [5]. Beauchamp writes that the “object of  morality 
is to prevent or limit problems of  indifference, conflict, hostility, 
scarce resources, limited information, and the like” [5]. He gives 
examples of  moral principles and more specific rules that morally 
serious persons accept (Figure 1).
A specific moral rule can be justified by more than one princi-
ple; so, there is a nonlinear correlation between specific rules and 
principles. Specifying a principle is to narrow the scope of  the 
principle and making it action-guiding while retaining the moral 
obligations in the original form [2]. Hence, specifying a principle 
makes it useful for managing practical cases. For instance, the gen-
eral principle of  respect for autonomy can be specified into the 
more specific rule of  respecting the privacy of  others (Figure 1).
Beauchamp accepts moral pluralism, he thinks that the moral 
rules of  the common morality are not specified  and interpreted 
the same way in all cultures because of  different religious, cultural 
commitments, or the like. Hence, different moralities are present 
in the way Beauchamp calls morality in the broad sense [1,6]. Ac-
cording to Beauchamp, morality in the broad sense changes over 
time because of  interpretation, specification, balancing, and ne-
gotiation. However, morality in the narrow sense is unchanging, it 
forms the constraining framework [6].
So, Beauchamp distinguishes between moral in the narrow sense 
which contains general norms that are abstract, universal, and 
content-thin and moral in the broad sense which contains specific 
norms that are concrete, non-universal, and content-rich [1]. This 
way Beauchamp combines universalism with multiculturalism.
Managing Complex Cases of  Biomedicine
Beauchamp and Childress believe that four basic principles of  
respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice 
form the core part of  the common morality. These principles are 
basic for biomedical ethics and a good starting point for manag-
ing complex cases.
A brief  formulation of  the four ethical principles: the principles 
of  respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and jus-
tice [1,7,8].
In figure 2 the four basic principles of  the common morality are 
presented.
Beauchamp believes that it is “legitimate and rewarding” to ana-
lyze practical cases of  biomedicine through the four general prin-
ciples which are considered as prima facie binding [2]. A prima 
facie obligation is one that must be fulfilled in every circumstance 
unless it conflicts with a competing obligation. If  there is con-
flict between two or more principles, first the obligations must be 
specified, next, the weight of  each obligation must be determined 
and lastly, the obligations must be balanced [1].
According to Beauchamp, the first thing to do when managing 
practical cases of  biomedicine is to specify the principles involved 
to create practical guidelines and procedures. He defines specifi-
cation as “a process of  reducing the indeterminateness of  general 
norms to give them increased action guiding capacity, while re-
taining the moral commitments in the original norm” [2]. Speci-
fication is a narrowing of  the scope and it adds content to the 
norms. It is performed in order to reduce the conflicts among 
the norms involved in the case [2]. Specification requires that the 
norms are extended “by both narrowing their scope and general-
izing to relevantly similar circumstances” [1].
Norms involved in practical cases often need to be balanced. Bal-
ancing moral norms involves judgments about the relative weights 
and strengths of  the norms. So, acts of  balancing are supported 
by good reasons.  Often, balancing cannot be generalized to other 
cases, since the reasons given to outweigh a norm often “are spe-
cific to the needs of  this patient or this family in this circum-
stance” [1]. So, in contrast to specification, balancing is specific 
for the actual case at hand [1]. Beauchamp and Childress write 
that many different kinds of  considerations are involved in the 
process of  balancing. How physicians balance different norms 
often involves “sympathetic insight, humane responsiveness, and 
the practical wisdom of  evaluating a particular patient’s circum-
stance and needs” [1]. However, to reduce intuition and open-
endedness, Beauchamp and Childress list some conditions that 
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must be fulfilled to justify the infringement of  one prima facie 
norm to adhere to another (Figure 3).
In the article ‘Methods and principles in biomedical ethics’ pub-
lished in Journal of  Medical Ethics [2], Beauchamp analyses a 
case where an American Jehovah’s Witness accepts the authority 
of  that tradition and refuses a blood transfusion recommended 
by the physicians. The subsequent case analysis is freely adapted 
from Beauchamp’s article. In the case at hand, the religious com-
mitments of  the patient conflict with the healing commitments 
of  the physicians. The Jehovah’s Witness has autonomously cho-
sen to accept the doctrines of  his faith [1,2]. In this case, the 
following two principles conflict: respect for autonomy of  the 
patient and beneficence of  the doctors (the case does not involve 
a principle of  distributive justice, since a blood transfusion cannot 
be seen as highly expensive medical material in western societies). 
Figure 1.The four basic principles of  the common morality
The principle of  respect for autonomy
• “As a negative obligation: Autonomous actions should not be subjected to controlling constraints by others” [1].
• “As a positive obligation, this principle requires both respectful treatment in disclosing information and actions that foster au-
tonomous decision making” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 104). Furthermore, this principle obligates to “disclose informa-
tion, to probe for and ensure understanding and voluntariness, and to foster adequate decision making” [1].
The principle of  beneficence
• One ought to prevent and remove evil or harm
• One ought to do and promote good (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 151).
The principle of  nonmaleficence
“One ought not to inflict evil or harm”, where harm is understood as “thwarting, defeating, or setting back some party’s interests” 
[1].
The principle of  justice
Beauchamp & Childress do not think that a single principle can address all problems of  distributive justice [1]. They defend a frame-
work for allocation that incorporates both utilitarian and egalitarian standards. A fair health care system includes two strategies for 
health care allocation: 1) a utilitarian approach stressing maximal benefit to patients and society, and 2) an egalitarianstrategy empha-
sising the equal worth of  persons and fair opportunity (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, pp. 275, 281).
The following two rules do conflict.
• It is morally objectionable to risk dead for a patient whose 
life threatening condition can be medically managed by non-
expensive medical material.
• It is morally objectionable to disrespect a patient’s refusal of  
treatment [2].
Beauchamp specifies rule 2 into rule 2.1. (Where much of  the 
content of  rule 2 is intact):
1.1.   It is morally objectionable to disrespect a patient’s refusal 
of  treatment, unless the refusal is nonautonomous and presents a 
significant danger to the patient [2].
Since the Jehovah’s Witness has autonomously chosen to follow 
the directions of  this tradition, the specified rule 2.1. Clearly says 
that the refusal of  the patient should be respected and compelling 
a blood transfusion cannot be justified under any conditions [2].
Imagine another case where American parents committed to 
Jehovah’s Witness faith refuse a blood transfusion for their two 
years old child. Are the physicians morally obligated to respect 
this refusal or can compelling a blood transfusion being justified? 
The following two rules do conflict:
1.   It is morally objectionable to risk dead for a patient whose life 
threatening condition can be medically managed by non-expen-
sive medical material.
2.  It is morally objectionable to disrespect a parental refusal of  
treatment [2].
Beauchamp specifies rule 2 into rule 2.1.
1.  It is morally objectionable to disrespect a parental refusal of  
treatment, unless the refusal constitutes child abuse, child neglect, 
or violates a right of  the child [2].
2.1.  Needs further specification stating what is meant by child 
abuse, child neglect, and the rights of  the child. Without going 
more into details on the examination and specification of  these 
concepts here, shortly, Beauchamp’s view is that it is not only 
morally permitted but morally required “to overrule this parental 
refusal of  treatment, because the refusal does constitute a form 
of  child abuse, child endangerment, child neglect, or inattention 
to the rights of  the child” [2]. So, in this case the right choice of  
the physician is to overrule the refusal of  the parents and compel 
a blood transfusion to the child [2].
However, we must be aware, according to Beauchamp, specified 
moral frameworks developed through case analysis are works in 
evolvement, they are changeable and they can vary from person 
to person and from culture to culture [2].
The Danish philosophers Jacob Rendtorff  and Peter Kemp also 
believe that the four principles of  Beauchamp and Childress are 
unsuited to Europe. They propose a specific European ethics in 
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contrast to the American ethics of  Beauchamp and Childress. 
They think that the moral principles of  autonomy, dignity, in-
tegrity, and vulnerability are useful for analyzing ethical issues in 
Europe. Rendtorff  and Kemp believe that their theory is “based 
on the protection of  the fragile and finite, bodily incarnated hu-
man person” [4]. By focusing on the integrity and dignity of  the 
individual, they think that their model leads to a wider view of  
the human person than Beauchamp and Childress’ theory, which 
focuses on the autonomous individual [4]. Beauchamp replies 
to Rendtorff  and Kemps critique. First of  all, he states that it is 
wrong to believe in specific principles for Europe and further-
more, he states that what Rendtorff  and Kemp call principles are 
not principles at all. For instance, the moral concept of  integrity 
is a virtue. And vulnerability is a property or condition of  persons. 
Next, he thinks that dignity is one of  the most obscure moral 
concepts of  bioethics since nobody actually knows what dignity 
is (personal communication with Beauchamp). Beauchamp and 
Childress write: “human dignity – an unclear notion that moral 
theory has done little to clarify” [1]. Lastly, Beauchamp writes that 
empirical investigation could prove him or his critics wrong [5]. 
However, we do not believe that empirical research could prove 
whether a universal common morality exists or not. We think that 
Beauchamp should soften this formulation up writing that scien-
tific research could indicate whether he or his critics are wrong.
Ethicists Ruiping Fan from East Asia argues that the principle of  
respect for autonomy as formulated by Beauchamp and Childress 
differs from the East Asian principle of  autonomy. He writes that 
these two principles of  autonomy do not have an abstract con-
tent in common, they are two different principles. Basically, the 
Western principle demands self-determination whereas the East 
Asian principle requires family-determination. According to Fan, 
these two principles of  autonomy “differ from each other in the 
most general sense and basic moral requirement” and the Western 
principle cannot be used in East Asia [9].
Suitable Method for Empirical Study of  the Com-
mon Morality
In this section we will give a more detailed description on how 
an empirical study investigating indications of  the existence of  
the common morality of  Beauchamp and Childress could be de-
signed. This method was developed for a Danish empirical study 
investigating the ethics of  molecular biologists and cancer physi-
cians [7]. The method draws on Lindseth & Norberg (2004) and 
Pedersen (1999). These researchers developed a phenomeno-
logical-hermeneutical method based on interviews to reveal and 
understand experienced phenomena [10,11]. Lindseth&Norberg 
used this method specifically to reveal the morals and the ethi-
cal thinking of  physicians and nurses [12,13]. According to these 
authors, this method can be used to elucidate the essential and 
understandable meaning of  good and bad as actually lived in hu-
man experience [11]. They consider the approach of  this method 
as phenomenological because the aim was to reveal and describe 
the understandable meaning of  lived experience. According to 
Lindseth & Norberg (2004) and Pedersen (1999), narrative inter-
views are an appropriate method for revealing the understandable 
meaning of  lived experience. These narratives are transcribed and 
need interpretation; therefore the approach is hermeneutical. The 
phenomenological-hermeneutical approach was used both for the 
overall design of  the interview guide and for the data analysis [7].
Based on Lindseth & Norberg (2004) and Pedersen (1999), the 
ethical reasoning and experience of  molecular biologists and can-
cer physicians were revealed in the current study by conducting 
semi-structured interviews. In a semi-structured interview, the 
questions are open-ended and thematic. In the study, the phenom-
enological approach was applied at the beginning of  the interview, 
when the respondent was asked to narrate his/her experience of  
ethically difficult situations as freely as possible. The interviewer 
asked questions aimed at promoting additional narration, such 
as “who?” and”what happened next?”. Later on in the interview, 
there was a shift from the phenomenological approach character-
ised by abstaining from making judgements to a hermeneutical 
approach, where the interviewer encourages the interviewee to 
reflect on his/her narrative by asking “why?” and “how?”. Here 
the approach was hermeneutic, since the respondent was asked 
to reflect and interpret on his/her narrative. This shows that the 
basic approach of  the overall design of  the interview guide was 
phenomenological-hermeneutical [7].
Discussion
To show that it is possible to investigate ethical considerations 
and principles of  respondents empirically by the method men-
tioned, we will shortly summarize some of  the results of  the Dan-
ish empirical study for which the method was developed.  The 
aim of  the Danish empirical study was to investigate the ethical 
considerations and principles of  Danish oncology physicians and 
Danish molecular biologists. This study was based on 12 semi-
structured interviews with three groups of  respondents: a group 
of  oncology physicians working in a clinic at a public hospital and 
two groups of  molecular biologists conducting basic research, 
one group employed at a public university and the other in a pri-
vate biopharmaceutical company.
In this study, respondents were asked specifically whether they ad-
here to the principle of  nonmaleficence. This is in line with Beau-
champs recommendations for an empirical study of  the common 
morality [1]. According to the study, molecular biologists explic-
itly considered nonmaleficence in relation to the environment, the 
researchers’ own health, and animal models; and only implicitly in 
relation to patients or human subjects. In contrast, considerations 
of  nonmaleficence by oncology physicians related to patients or 
human subjects. This study indicated that oncology physicians 
and molecular biologists employed in a private biopharmaceuti-
cal company had the specific principle of  beneficence in mind 
in their daily work. Both groups seemed motivated to help sick 
patients. Physicians and molecular biologists both considered the 
principle of  respect for autonomy as a negative obligation in the 
sense that informed consent of  patients should be respected. Mo-
lecular biologists stressed that very sick patients might be con-
strained by the circumstances to make a certain choice. However, 
in contrast to molecular biologists, physicians experienced the 
principle of  respect for autonomy as a positive obligation because 
the physician, in dialogue with the patient, offers a medical prog-
nosis evaluation based upon the patients’ wishes and ideas, mutual 
understanding, and respect. Finally, this study disclosed a utilitar-
ian element in the concept of  justice as experienced by molecular 
biologists from the private biopharmaceutical company and egali-
tarian and utilitarian characteristics in the overall conception of  
justice as conceived by oncology physicians. Molecular biologists 
employed at a public university were, in this study, concerned with 
just allocation of  resources; however, they do not support a spe-
cific theory of  justice. Hence, this study indicated that the ethical 
principles of  respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, 
and justice as formulated by Beauchamp & Childress were related 
to the ethical reflections of  the Danish oncology physicians and 
the Danish molecular biologists. Hence, the study suggested that 
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these principles are important for Danish biomedical practice 
[7,15-17].
Conclusion
In this article we have examinedhow to investigate whether there 
are indications that the bioethical principles of  Beauchamp and 
Childress are specifically western or whether they are cross cul-
tural. Critics indicate that the principles are unsuited for Europe 
and East Asia. However, Beauchamp maintains that empirical re-
search can be used to test the hypothesis that a common cross cul-
tural morality based on the four principles does exist or not. We 
argued that indications for a common morality can be explored by 
qualitative research based on narrative interviews.  We outlined a 
phenomenological-hermeneutical method which we have already 
used to investigate the ethics of  Danish oncologists and molecu-
lar biologists. In this article we argued that this method is also 
useful to investigate the ethics of  oncologists in European, East 
Asian, and American cultures.
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